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RESUMO
Neste artigo, analisamos a possibilidade de haver interpretações fracas com descrições 
demonstrativas. Olhando para os dados do português brasileiro, a resposta parece ser 
negativa. Para saber a razão para tanto, é necessário adotarmos uma teoria sobre defi nidos 
fracos. Neste trabalho, adotamos a teoria de Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts (2010), que 
propõe que a interpretação fraca envolve referência a espécies. Adotamos também uma teoria 
sobre demonstrativos segundo a qual eles são um tipo de descrição defi nida com pressuposições 
específi cas. Com essas teorias, é possível explicar as razões para não termos normalmente 
uma interpretação fraca com descrições demonstrativas, também é possível encontrar um tipo 
particular de contexto no qual de fato é possível encontrar interpretações fracas com  descrições 
demonstrativas.
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we analyze the possibility of  attributing weak interpretations to demonstrative 
descriptions. When we consider data from Brazilian Portuguese, our fi rst impression is that 
it is impossible. To know the reasons for this constraint it is necessary to have a theory 
of  weak defi nites. In this paper, we adopt Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts (2010)’s theory, 
which states that the weak interpretation involves reference to kinds. We also adopt a theory 
of  demonstratives which claims that they are in fact a kind of  defi nite description with 
specifi c presuppositions. With this theoretical background we can explain why it is normally 
impossible to have weak interpretations with demonstrative descriptions and we can also 
fi nd a particular type of  context which allows for weak interpretations of  demonstrative 
descriptions.
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Introduction: weak defi nites and their properties
The phenomenon of  weak defi nites has attracted the attention of  
linguists mainly because it poses serious challenges to one of  the most 
well established consensus about the semantics (and use) of  defi nite 
articles: the uniqueness (either as an assertion or as a presupposition) 
associated with it. Examples such as (1) and (2), below do not seem to 
require, at least in Brazilian Portuguese (BrP), a unique referent; they 
also convey “enriched meanings” – the two most distinguished features 
of  weak defi nites (cf. Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts, 2010; Vogel, 2011, 
among others):
(1)  Pra chegar até     aqui,  você tem que pegar o ônibus.
 To  arrive  until  here   you  have  to  take  the bus.
 ‘To get here, you must take the bus.’
(2)  Bom, gente, agora vou         sair,   vou            no    mercado 
(i.e., do shopping)
 Well   guys   now   willfi rst-person leave gofi rstperson  in+the market
 ‘Well guys, I’m leaving now, I’m going to the market.’
In short, it is possible to fi nd in the literature the following properties 
associated with weak defi nites, all of  them exemplifi ed by the example 
in (3) below:
Renato Miguel Basso & Diego Rafael Vogt
181
a)  (apparent) violation of  the uniqueness presupposition
b)  enriched meaning
c)  sloppy identity in elliptical contexts
d)  narrow scope
e)  lexical restriction
f)  compatibility only with modifi ers that establish (or result in) 
subtypes of  the nouns they modify
(3) João  foi   para  o   hospital.
 ‘John went  to   the hospital’
a)  (apparent) violation of  the uniqueness presupposition  the 
identity of  the hospital is irrelevant, and (3) can be used in a 
context in which the participants know that there is more than 
one (salient) hospital.
b)  enriched meaning  John went to the hospital to be treated, for 
healing, or because he works there...
c)  sloppy identity in elliptical contexts  John went to the hospital 
and Mary did too (possibly to different hospitals)
d)  narrow scope  Every student was sent to the hospital 
(distributive interpretation; i.e., the students were sent to 
different hospitals)
e)  lexically restricted  John went to the clinic. – no weak 
interpretation
f)  accepts only modifi ers that establish subtypes (or subkinds) of  
the nouns they modify
 John went to the mental hospital –weak interpretation is possible
 John went to the old hospital – no weak interpretation
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Although a lot of  work has been devoted to the weak defi nite article, 
analyzing this phenomenon either as a type of  kind-reference (Aguilar-
Guevara & Zwarts, 2010) or as a type of  semantic incorporation 
(Carlson et alii 2006; Bosch 2010), no attention has been devoted to 
the other sort of  determiner which has a defi nite interpretation, namely 
demonstratives. 
As we’ll see in the following sections (mainly in section 2), although 
there are some controversies about the semantic of  demonstratives, 
we’ll argue that demonstratives and defi nite descriptions form a class; 
our evidence is examples such as1:
Uses of  the demonstrative
deictic uses anaphoric uses
descriptive uses
(i.e., non-deictic, 
non-anaphoric)
(a) The cat is 
sleeping (pointing 
to a cat) 
(b) That cat is 
sleeping (pointing 
to a cat)
(c) A womani walked in. 
The womani was smiling 
(d) A womani walked. 
That womani smiled to 
another women
(e) The student who 
fi nish the exam may 
leave the room 
(f) That student who 
fi nish the exam may 
leave the room
Given that demonstratives and defi nite descriptions show similar 
uses and interpretations, it is reasonable to consider them as forming 
a unifi ed class; the next step is to argue for a unifi ed semantics for 
them, and this can only be done if  we take each one as some sort of  
description and not as referential terms – that’s why (among other 
reasons) we claim that demonstratives are a kind of  defi nite description 
(cf. King, 2001; Roberts, 2002; Wolter, 2006; Elbourne, 2008, Basso, 
2009). So our main question in this paper is: can demonstratives give 
1 Cf. King, 2001; Roberts, 2002; Wolter, 2006; Basso, 2009, among many others.
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rise to weak interpretations in the sense that the uniqueness in their use 
is not (apparently) required? 
Based on the following examples, our fi rst answer is ‘no’:
(4)  Pra chegar até    aqui, você  tem que pegar esse/aquele ônibus. 
(only one bus)
 To arrive  until  here   you  have  to  take   this / that   bus
 ‘To get here, you must take this/that bus.’
(5)  Bom, gente, agora vou        sair, vou            nesse/naquele 
mercado. (only one store).
 Well   guys  now        will1rst-person leave go1rst-person in   this/that      store
 ‘Well guys, I’m leaving now, I’m going to this/that store.’
(6)  Maria leu esse/aquele jornal. (only one newspaper)
 Maria readpast this/that  newspaper
 ‘Maria read this/that newspaper.’
(7) João foi pra esse/aquele médico (only one doctor)
 João gopast to this/that doctor.     
 ‘João went to this/that doctor.’ 
The examples from (4) to (7) have only a strong interpretation (i.e., 
they refer to specifi c individuals or entities) and show none of  the other 
properties related to weak interpretations:
(8) João  foi  pra esse/aquele  hospital.
 João gopast to this/that hospital
 ‘John went to  this/that     hospital.’
a)  no (apparent) violation of  the uniqueness presupposition  
there is only one (specifi c) hospital
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b)  no enriched meaning  ??? to be treated, for healing...
c)  no sloppy identity in elliptical contexts  ... and Mary did too 
(same hospital)
d)  absence of  narrow scope interpretation  Every student was 
sent to this/that hospital (no distributive interpretation)
e)  lexically restricted  doesn’t apply
f)  accepts only adjectives that establish subtypes of  the nouns they 
 doesn’t apply
Considering the similarities between defi nites and demonstratives, 
why can’t demonstrative descriptions have weak interpretations in the 
same way that defi nite descriptions can? Is there any kind of  context 
in which demonstrative descriptions have a weak interpretation? The 
answers to these questions can improve our understanding of  the 
semantics of  demonstratives and also of  the phenomenon of  weak 
defi nite. But before we answer these questions we need to have a theory 
about weak defi nites as well as a theory about demonstrative descriptions. 
In this paper we adopt Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts (2010)’s theory 
for weak defi nites (section 1) and we treat demonstrative descriptions 
as a type of  defi nite description, which have specifi c presuppositions 
associated with them, as proposed by Wolter (2006) (section 2). Our 
next step will be to look at demonstrative reference to kinds (section 3). 
After presenting our theoretical assumptions, we’ll go back to possible 
weak demonstratives in sections 4 and 5. In section 4 we explain 
why it seems impossible to normally have weak interpretations with 
demonstrative descriptions, and in section 5 we will present a specifi c 
context in which it is indeed possible to have weak interpretations with 
demonstrative descriptions and we will also show the reasons why. Our 
main conclusions are presented in section 6.
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1  Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts (2010)’s theory for weak 
defi nites
According to Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts (2010)’s theory, weak 
defi nites maintain the uniqueness presupposition associated with 
defi nites although not with respect to particular concrete individuals but 
with respect to kinds.
Their analyses involve an instantiation or realization relation R, and a 
notion of  stereotypical usage events U (which accounts for the enriched 
meaning associated with weak defi nites). These ideas can explain, in 
principle, the main properties of  weak defi nites. Consider the following 
sentence:
(9)  John went to the hospital
According to their analyses we have:
(9’)  e[go-to(e) ^ Ag(e) = John ^ R(Ref(e); H) ^ U(e; H)]
As the formula in (9’) shows, there is no quantifi cation over ‘hospitals’ 
(H) but only an instantiation relation applied to the kind ‘hospital’ 
(R(Ref(e); H)), which is the goal (or theme) of  the “going event”; and 
there is a set of  usage (common, typical) events associated with hospital 
(U(e; H)), which involves healing or treatment events among others. The 
absence of  quantifi cation can account for the sloppy identity in anaphora 
as well as for the narrow scope reading. The usage events constraint can 
account for the lexical restrictions associated with weak readings and also 
for the fact that only modifi ers which results in subkinds can maintain 
the weak interpretation (as claimed by the authors, usage events can be 
established only with kinds and/or subkinds).
There are of  course more subtleties and further developments of  
this theory. Be it as it may, to our purposes in this paper, the two most 
important features of  Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts (2010)’s theory 
are: (a) the maintenance of  the uniqueness associated with defi nite 
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descriptions and (b) the assumption that weak interpretations involve 
kinds and/or subkinds.
We have at last a theory which assumes uniqueness and appeals to 
kinds (and subkinds), in the next section we’ll consider the semantics of  
demonstratives.
2  A semantic analyses for demonstrative descriptions
In principle, it is possible to have two different approaches for 
demonstrative descriptions2: (i) a direct reference approach, as proposed 
by Kaplan (1989), Braun (2008), Dever (2001), etc. (note that each author 
argues for a direct reference approach but their proposals are not the 
same); and (ii) indirect reference approach, in which the demonstrative 
can be treat as a quantifi er (King, 2001) or as a determiner (Roberts, 
2002; Elbourne, 2008; Wolter, 2006).
As expected, all of  these approaches have their merits and problems. 
From a linguistic point of  view, due, among others reasons, to syntactic 
and semantics arguments, demonstratives are more naturally treated 
as determiners (for counter-arguments to this, see, e.g., Dever, 2001), 
alongside with defi nite descriptions. 
Thus, considering Roberts (2002)’s, Elbourne (2008)’s and Wolter 
(2006)’s proposals, we’ll adopt the latter because it’s more economical 
and covers a wider range of  data3. 
2.1  Wolter (2006)’s proposal for demonstrative descriptions
According to Wolter’s theory, defi nite and demonstrative 
descriptions share the same assertion content but differ with respect to 
2 Demonstrative descriptions (also known as complex demonstratives) are expressions 
composed by a demonstrative and an NP (DEM + NP); this is the only kind of  demonstrative 
constructions that we’ll consider in this paper. There are some complicated and interesting issues 
in trying to extend our considerations to plural demonstrative descriptions and also to simple 
demonstratives (singular and/or plural).
3 A thorough defense of  Wolter (2006)’s proposal is not the aim of  this paper.
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their presuppositions. The only difference between these descriptions 
– leaving aside the distal/proximal properties showed by ‘this’ versus 
‘that’4 – is that defi nite descriptions presuppose uniqueness with respect 
to a conversational situation or context; i.e., maximal or default situation, 
while demonstrative descriptions presuppose uniqueness with respect to 
a proper subpart of  a conversational situation or context; i.e., not the 
maximal situation, but a non-default situation5.
To illustrate this point, consider a scenario where there are two 
different paintings in an art gallery; in this context, (10) is bad even with 
a pointing gesture, and (11), with a pointing gesture, is good:
(10)  # I like the painting6.
(11)  I like this painting.
In Wolter’s theory the pointing gesture associated with demonstratives 
is used to establish a non-default situation. So, in the scenario above, 
when someone points to a single painting, a non-default situation is 
established in which there is only one painting (which is the one being 
pointed to). In this non-default situation, the use of  a demonstrative 
description like ‘this painting’ is felicitous exactly because there is only 
4 In BrP, ‘esse/este’ versus ‘aquele’. We consider that in spoken BrP there is no more difference 
between ‘esse’ and ‘este’.
5 One of  the reviewers of  this paper said that: “It is really surprisingly that ‘the’ and ‘that’ have 
the same semantics, except for a ‘non-default’ requirement by the demonstrative pronoun. I 
intuitively expected that the demonstrative should presuppose “other elements in the set”, what 
does not holds for the defi nite description”. If  what is meant by “other elements in the set” is that 
there can more than one element in the denotation of  the NP composing the descriptions, then 
obviously the uniqueness with respect to a non-default situation entails that there can be “other 
elements in the set” – the examples in (10) and (11) in the sequence show just that. It would also 
be wrong to assume that “there are other elements in the set” is a presupposition because we can 
use a demonstrative description in a context in which there is only one (relevant) object even in 
the maximal situation. Since the presupposition associated with the defi nite description acts in 
maximal situations, obviously there can’t be “more than one element in the set” (i.e., which is in 
the denotation of  the relevant NP) for a felicitous use of  a defi nite description.
6 Even if  (10) is accepted in this context, there is a clear preference for using (11).
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one painting in the non-default situation – this scenario satisfi es the 
uniqueness presupposed by the demonstrative (which is the same as 
the presupposition associated with the defi nite, but which acts in the 
maximal situation in the case of  defi nite descriptions).
These intuitions can be apprehended by the formulations below 
(Wolter’s defi nitions (p. 64):
[[then]]: λP.P(sn) is a singleton set.
If  defi ned, denotes ιx.P(x)(sn)
[[thatn]]: λP.P(sn) is a singleton set and sn is non-default.
If  defi ned, denotes ιx.P(x)(sn)
Wolter’s theory is naturally extended to deal with non-referential 
uses of  demonstratives, as anaphoric and descriptive uses.
Our next step is to understand the relation between demonstratives 
and kind reference, considering that, in accordance with Aguilar-Guevara 
and Zwarts (2010)’s theory, reference to kinds (or subkinds) is necessary 
in order to have weak interpretations.
3 Another piece of  evidence: demonstrative reference 
to kinds
Demonstrative descriptions cannot normally be used to refer to 
kinds, as the example (12) shows, but it’s natural to use demonstrative 
descriptions to refer to subkinds, as in the example (13) (at least in 
Brazilian Portuguese; for the same considerations and conclusions 
concerning English demonstratives, cf. Bowdle & Ward, 1995):
Pointing to a whale:
(12)  A baleia tá em extinção OK-kind
 the whale  is  in extinction 
 ‘The whale is in extinction.’
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(13)  Essa baleia/Aquela baleia tá em extinção OK-subkind
 this whale/  that   whale    is  in  extinction
 ‘This whale/ that whale is in extinction.’ 
(12) can mean something like whalek is in extinction or something 
like a subkind of  whales is in extinction; but (13) can only mean that a 
subkind of  whales is in extinction, i.e. the one (subkind) being pointed 
to or represented by the one (whale) being pointed to.
Consider now another example (“K” is for kind and “SK” is for 
subkind – a kind interpretation would be something like “Dogs are 
friendly” and a subkind interpretation, “Golden retrievers are friendly”): 
Pointing to a golden retriever:
DEM + “empty name” DEM description DEF description
Esse animal é amigável 
okK, okSK
This animal is friendly 
okK, okSK
Esse cachorro é 
amigável *K, okSK
This dog is friendly 
*K, okSK
O cachorro é amigável 
okK, *SK (specifi c only)
The dog is friendly okK, 
*SK
Esse tipo de animal é 
amigável okK, okSK
This kind of  animal is 
friendly okK, okSK
Esse tipo de 
cachorro é amigável 
*K, okSK
This kind of  dog is 
friendly *K, okSK
# O tipo de cachorro é 
amigável *K, *SK
# The kind of  dog is 
friendly *K, *SK
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As the table above shows, the only way to refer to a kind using 
demonstrative descriptions is when the NP position in the description 
is fi lled with an “empty” or “non-informative” name, e.g. ‘animal’7, 
otherwise demonstrative descriptions can refer only to subkinds, as 
shown by the roll in the middle of  the table above.
We propose that the restrictions of  kind reference associated with 
demonstrative descriptions are due to the semantics of  the demonstrative: 
to refer to kinds it is necessary to have the maximal situation, with no 
further restrictions8. But, as proposed by Wolter, demonstratives do 
impose a restriction: they work only on non-default situations, and that 
is why we cannot normally use demonstrative descriptions to refer to 
kinds, but only to subkinds – subkinds reference can be felicitous within 
non-default situations and doesn’t require maximal situations.
So far, we presented a theory for weak defi nites which preserves 
the uniqueness presupposition associated with defi nites, we argued that 
demonstratives are a kind of  defi nite which shows specifi c presupposition 
(i.e., uniqueness in a non-default situation), and we also showed that 
demonstrative reference to kinds is not free from certain restrictions; 
we claimed that these restrictions have to do with the semantics of  the 
demonstratives which allows them to refer to subkinds but not to kinds 
(only when the NP position is fi lled with an “empty name”). In the 
next section we return to the possibilities of  weak interpretations for 
demonstrative descriptions with the theoretical assumptions seen so far.
7 It is not clear why this is so. We need to achieve a better understating of  the role played by 
the “empty names” and also the semantics of  the “that kind of  N” constructions. These are 
certainly important and interesting questions, but they are not our main concern in this paper.
8 That demonstrative descriptions don’t refer to kinds because these descriptions impose 
restrictions on the discursive situations is yet a point to be fully made. But the common idea that 
kinds are spatiotemporally discontinuous individuals, modeled as the sum of  all instances of  
the kind in every world (cf. Chierchia, 1998; Müller e Oliveira, 2004) agrees with our proposals 
concerning demonstrative descriptions. The characterization of  kinds offered by Liebesman 
(2011) goes along the same lines.
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4 Why not weak demonstratives?
The reason why it is impossible to have weak interpretations of  
demonstrative descriptions is that we need kind reference to have weak 
interpretations (according to Aguilar-Guevera and Zwarts (2010)’s 
proposal), but demonstratives are always restricted to smaller domains 
(i.e., non-default situations) in comparison to the defi nite description and 
therefore can’t refer to kinds; since demonstratives can’t refer to kinds 
(because kind reference works only in maximal or default situations), to 
only option left for the demonstratives is to refer to instantiations (or 
“regular individuals”), and so we don’t have weak interpretations with 
demonstrative descriptions.
Consider the following illustration for the example (8), repeated 
below:
(8)  João  foi  pra esse/aquele hospital
 João gopast to this/that hospital
 ‘John went to  this/that     hospital.’
Kind HOSPITAL
The defi nite description 
can have access to all 
the entities, from kinds 
to specifi c individuals
instantiations h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6...
Due to its semantics, the demonstrative description can’t have access to 
kinds, but only to entities below the kind-level (subkinds or individuals)
As the illustration shows, the item ‘hospital’ in example (8) can, 
in principle, refer to kind-level or individual-level entities. Weak 
interpretations need access to the kind-level but, since demonstratives, 
due to their semantics, can’t have access to the kind-level, the only 
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option left is the individual-level and that is why sentence (8) refers to a 
specifi c/particular hospital.
But, as we propose in the next section, there is a particular type of  
context in which demonstrative can have weak interpretations.
5 No weak demonstratives at all?...
In order to describe the contexts in which we argue that it is possible 
to have a weak interpretation with demonstrative descriptions, consider 
the two conclusions we arrived so far: (i) although demonstrative 
descriptions can refer to subkinds by pointing to instantiations if  the 
right contextual conditions are fullfi lled, they can refer to kinds only 
under specifi c restrictions (i.e., when combined with an “empty name”, 
as in ‘this kind of animal’); and (ii) although weak interpretations don’t 
accept all types of  modifi ers, they do accept modifi ers which result in 
subtypes or subkinds9.
Putting these two ideas together, maybe there are some cases in which 
demonstrative descriptions can have weak interpretations. Consider the 
sentence (14) bellow, a well-behaved weak defi nite with a modifi er:
(14) João ligou pro médico do coração / de pele / do olho  
(cardiologista / dermatologia / oftalmologista)
 João callpast the doctor of  the heart/of  skin/of  the eye
 ‘John called the heart/skin/ eye doctor.’
Imagine now a context in which there is a list showing the names of  
medical specialties, and Peter, reporting what John did, says (15), while 
pointing to the label ‘dermatology’ (‘skin doctor’):
9 It is far from easy to defi ne subkinds and taxonomies; in this paper, we follow Dayal (2004). 
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(15) João chamou esse médico.
 João callpast this doctor.
 ‘John   called   this  doctor.’
Allergy and Immunology Anesthesiology
Colon and Rectal Surgery Dermatology
Emergency Medicine Family Medicine
General Surgery Internal Medicine
Medical Genetics Neurological Surgery
Neurology Nuclear Medicine
Obstetrics and Gynecology Ophthalmology
Orthopaedic Surgery Otolaryngology
Pathology Pediatrics
Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Plastic Surgery
Preventive Medicine Psychiatry
Radiation Oncology Radiology
Thoracic Surgery Urology
(https://www.aamc.org/students/medstudents/cim/specialties/)
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In the suggested context, (15) has the main properties of  “regular” 
or “ordinary” weak defi nites:
• (15)  John called this doctor and Mary did it too. 
 Ok if  they did not call the same doctor, but doctors which have 
the same medical specialty, namely skin doctors (i.e., they may have 
called different skin doctors)
• enriched meaning: called for medical assistance
• narrow scope: Every student called this doctor10 (i.e., every 
student called the skin doctor, but most likely different ones)
But what happened in this case? Our suggestion is that we establish, 
via contextual information (i.e., by pointing to a list of  medical 
specialties), a taxonomy of  subkinds, as the next illustration shows:
kinds DOCTOR
 subkinds  heart-doc. skin-doc. eye-doc. …
 instantiations  d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6...
In this confi guration, there are salient subkinds accessible and the 
demonstrative descriptions may refer to them, giving rise to a weak 
interpretation. Compare this illustration with the one associated to the 
example (8) – in that illustration there are no subkinds accessible11.
10 Of  course, this sentence (i.e., the construction ‘this doctor’) should be said while point to the 
label “dermatology” in the table shown above.
11 This doesn’t mean, of  course, that there are not subkinds of  hospitals, but only that the example 
in (8) didn’t make them available and/or relevant, so they are not accessible to demonstrative 
descriptions.
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In short, our claim is that in the context given for example (15) the 
use of  the demonstrative description with a proper pointing gesture has 
exactly the same effect of  the modifi er which combined with defi nite 
descriptions results in a subkind.
For another example of  this type of  context, consider the following 
scenario, which summarized the press political tendencies from a small 
kingdom. In this kingdom, each newspaper falls neatly into one of  three 
political tendencies:  leftist (4 different newspapers), center (3 different 
newspapers), and rightist (3 different newspapers). The table below 
summarizes this scenario, by sorting the newspapers into three columns 
(the traces (----) stand for the newspapers’ names):
NEWSPAPERS
Leftist Rightist Center 
----
----
----
----
----
----
----
----
----
----
Pointing to the left-hand column, Mary says:
(16) João vai ler esse jornal e Maria também.
 João goPRES to read this newspaper and Mary too
 ‘John will read this newspaper, and Mary will do that too.’
Again, in this context, the weak interpretation is prominent and we 
claim that the reason for this is that we have established and have access 
to subkinds of  newspapers, and given that the demonstrative description 
(‘this newspaper’) can refer not only to a specifi c individual but also to 
a subkinds (i.e., left-hand newspaper no matter which one) it is possible 
to have a weak interpretation. Reference to subkinds guarantees weak 
interpretations.
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In short: demonstratives cannot have access to kind-level individual 
because its domain is always smaller compared to the defi nite, but they 
can have access to subkind-level individuals; when there is no salient 
subkinds available, the only alternative for demonstrative descriptions 
is to refer to instantiations (individual-level). That is the reason why 
without a (contextually salient) taxonomy of  subkinds there are no weak 
demonstratives (“*w” stands for “no weak interpretation”):
(17)  *w João   foi  pra   esse      hospital.
 João goPAST to this hospital
 ‘John went to this/that hospital’
(18) *w João limpou      essa/aquela      garrafa azul.
 João cleanPAST this / that bottle blue
 ‘John cleaned this/that  bottle  blue.’
Unless a taxonomy of  hospitals and/or blue bottles is in the 
common-background there are no weak interpretations available.
One further point: it seems impossible to combine a demonstrative 
description with a modifi er that results in subkinds while at the same 
time preserve the weak interpretation (“ *w ” stands for “no weak 
interpretation”):
(19)  *w João vai ler este jornal de esquerda, e Maria também.
 João goPRES to read this newspaper of  left, and Maria too.
 *w John will read this left-wing newspaper, and Mary will do  
that too.
Why is it not grammatical to use a modifi er with the demonstrative to 
get a subkind interpretation? Our fi rst (and tentative) answer is: because 
the demonstrative already performs the role of  a modifi er that leads to 
a subkind and further modifi cations of  the subkind results in reference 
to instantiations.
Renato Miguel Basso & Diego Rafael Vogt
197
We are not claiming that these examples are the “best” sentences 
ever, but only that, given the semantics of  the demonstrative we adopted, 
combined with Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts (2010)’s analysis, the only 
way to have weak demonstratives is establishing a taxonomy of  subkinds.
Conclusion
In this paper, our point of  departure is a theory for weak defi nites 
which preserves the uniqueness presupposition commonly associated 
with defi nites and which claims that weak interpretations involve 
reference to kinds. Our aim was to analyze weak interpretation with 
demonstrative descriptions because these descriptions show important 
similarities with defi nite ones. We present and adopt a theory for 
demonstrative descriptions which claim that their semantics is closely 
related to the semantics of  the defi nite description and that they differ 
not with respect to their assertion content but with respect to their 
presuppositions.
Our next step was to investigate demonstrative reference to kinds 
because the theory for weak interpretation that we adopt explains the 
relevant data appealing to kind reference. When we put together all these 
considerations we can explain the facts concerning the possibilities of  
weak interpretation with demonstrative descriptions.
In our proposal for the existence and constraints concerning weak 
interpretations for demonstrative descriptions we can accommodate, 
without drastic modifi cations in the major picture of  weak defi nites, 
the absence of  weak demonstratives (which happens when there is no 
access to the subkind-level), on one hand, and the instances of  weak 
demonstratives (which happen when there is access to the subkind-
level), on the other hand.
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The semantic analysis proposed for demonstratives in this paper 
also explains why demonstrative descriptions don’t usually refer to kinds 
and why they denote only subkinds or (specifi c) individuals.
Finally, our analysis highlights the role of  taxonomies and domain 
restriction in the understanding of  noun phrases weak interpretations 
and can be seen as an argument in favor of  Aguilar-Guevera and Zwarts 
(2010)’s proposal.
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